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Abstract: Media markets are characterized by strong peculiarities that often call for long-
term exclusivity contracts between content providers and distributors or for vertical or 
horizontal integration. This paper analyzes and compares the economic effects of existing 
alternative systems of access to valuable content for new media platforms, under the lens 
of technological convergence and 'network neutrality'. The analysis suggests the 
increasing need for a coordinated regulatory framework aimed at balancing costs and 
benefits of the different models in order to ensure that the development of new markets 
and new technologies in the age of media convergence is not hindered by "anticommons" 
tragedies.
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his paper refers to the growing policy debate concerning access to 
valuable contents (premium content), which distinguishes the current 
stage of the evolution of European markets for pay-TV and the 
development of new media platforms and services. 
The current prominence of this debate can be attributed, on one side and 
to a large extent, to the remarkable asymmetry existing between the 
regulation of access to physical networks (fixed line, cable, x-DSL, 
Broadband, IP, DTH, DTT and so on) and the regulation of access and 
distribution of content to final customers; and, on the other to a growing 
attitude by contents' owners to split property rights according to the 
transmission platform and/or to the temporal distance from theatrical show. 
In recent decades a constant pressure has been exerted by European 
Directives on national regulators in order to adopt legislation aimed at 
encouraging entry in network industries through mandatory access to 
(*) This paper was firstly prepared for and presented at the EURO CPR Conference, on March 
25-26 March 2007, in Sevilla, Spain. 
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incumbents' essential facilities. In communication industries this process has 
led to clear asymmetric regulation, generally coupled with antitrust remedies, 
aimed at encouraging immediate entry in the market. The main rationale for 
these policy developments was to design a regulatory system capable of 
limiting longstanding dominant positions through entry of both resellers and 
facility-based operators. Entry policies pursued in most European countries 
had the effect of developing alternative platforms in the perspective of 
favouring the so-called process of convergence among alternative systems 
of technological transmission. In the course of this process, 
telecommunications models have been rapidly transformed into convergent 
communication models where traditional voice and data services are 
increasingly coupled with audiovisual contents delivered through fixed and 
wireless networks. 
However, regulation of access to contents has not kept up with the pace 
of network regulation, being mainly limited to sectoral intervention (as in the 
case of the regulation of rights over soccer events) and to antitrust remedies 
both at the national and European level (MENDES PEREIRA, 2003; NICITA 
& RAMELLO, 2005; HARRISON & WOODS, 2007). The continuous process 
of technological convergence among alternative transmission platforms has 
thus recently faced, in European countries, a dramatic hurdle: building 
alternative infrastructures to deliver contents to final customers is not the 
end of the story (HARRISON & WOODS, 2007). The process of technical 
convergence is characterized by an intense dynamics and offers unlimited 
ways to create new competitive opportunities in which different variables 
come into play – price, quality, programming – all to the advantage of 
consumers' welfare. In such a context, access to contents or, more 
specifically, to competitive packages of premium ('must have') contents has 
become the main competition and regulatory issue for communications 
industries. Since many valuable contents constitute the object of long-term 
exclusivity arrangements signed by vertically integrated incumbent 
operators, premium contents become new bottlenecks in media markets that 
have the potential to foreclose competition in communications markets and 
to inhibit any further development of the convergence processes. 
In this paper we discuss a number of the approaches currently adopted in 
some developed countries, outlining the main trade-offs they involve in terms 
of incentives and competition dynamics. Moreover, we highlight the risk that 
the overlapping of the models we consider may result in a situation akin to 
what is called, in the Law&Economics literature, an "anticommons", namely 
an excessive degree of fragmentation of property rights that may distort 
incentives to invest in the production/exploitation of content. We conclude A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  81 
that, whatever is the model or the set of models selected, it seems 
necessary to devise a coordinated approach at the European level explicitly 
devoted to the issue of access to contents and of its impact on the process 
of convergence in the media sector. 
  Regulatory and competition puzzles on access to 
premium contents 
The notion of audiovisual content encompasses a wide range of 
economic goods characterized both by an intangible nature and by the 
nature of experience goods. A distinction is usually traced between "basic 
contents" and "premium contents" on the basis of the degree of 
substitutability with other contents. Premium contents can be defined as 
special information goods characterized by a limited degree of 
substitutability with other contents from the consumers' perspective. They 
are usually represented by key sporting events and blockbuster movies. 
Production of premium contents generally takes place within firms dedicated 
to content production such as, for instance, Hollywood majors whereas 
"basic contents" are often produced within a vertically integrated free-to-air 
or pay-TV firm1.
The characteristics of audiovisual content production call for various 
forms of public policy intervention. The public good nature of audiovisual 
information goods (i.e., their non-rivalness and non-excludability) implies the 
existence of a market failure in the form of a lack of incentives to invest2 that 
justifies both intellectual property protection, Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) rules and, eventually, some form of public sponsorship of contents 
production (e.g., direct funding of cinema productions).  
Incentive problems have generally been particularly acute for premium 
contents as compared to basic contents. Indeed, production of premium 
contents is a capital-intensive business that involves substantial sunk costs 
1 To this traditional distinction should now be added the category of "user-generated contents", 
indicating audiovisual contents that represent the outcome of consumers’ creative effort, usually 
not directly aimed at earning a profit. The focus of this paper is on premium contents as it is only 
with respect to this type of content that an issue of efficient access emerges. 
2 See ARROW, 1962. For a survey of the debate on this topic see SALOKANNEL, STROWEL 
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and economies of scale (high fixed costs of production and low marginal 
costs of reproduction). The experience good nature of contents, i.e. the fact 
that their value can be assessed by consumers only upon purchase implies 
that, given the heterogeneity and dispersion of consumers' tastes, the 
market is characterized by a highly polarized demand: there are high rates of 
failures and most of the willingness to pay inheres just a few "stars". This 
might add to the incentive problem to the extent that it implies a high degree 
of market uncertainty and therefore lowers the expected returns to 
investment in content production.  
Other ex ante forms of public policy intervention address issues more 
specific to the audiovisual content industry. Regulations in the form of 
advertising quotas, national and original production quotas and rules to 
protect public decency have been devised to pursue social objectives such 
as pluralism, democracy and the promotion of national identity and also 
affect investment choices of content producers.  
Of crucial importance, especially as far as premium contents are 
concerned, is the set of ex ante and ex post rules and regulations affecting 
content distribution. The vertical chain of content distribution comprises 
essentially the following stages and main economic actors: (a) production of 
content, which involves content producers such as Hollywood Majors and 
content rightholders such as sports clubs and associations; (b) packaging of 
content (in Pay-TV, packaging implies the creation of channels and may be 
accompanied by the bundling of channels into packages), which has 
historically involved mainly editors and broadcasters; (c) delivery through a 
physical system or a technological platform. 
Distribution agreements constitute a means through which the marketing 
risk associated to content production is shared between content producers 
and distributors, so that the way distribution contracts are disciplined deeply 
influences both producers' and distributors' incentives to invest. Delivery 
systems can be of a physical or virtual nature. Physical distribution systems 
are constituted by theatrical distribution systems and by video rentals. Virtual 
delivery networks can be wireline or wireless, terrestrial transmission 
networks (analogic or digital), satellite transmission networks (point-to-point,
point-to-multipoint, or direct broadcast), or cable transmission networks 
(here the scenario is even more confused due the possibility to use digital A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  83 
telephone lines such as ISDN, ADSL e xDSL)  3. The final consumer may 
have access to contents distributed through virtual platforms by using at 
least three types of terminal equipment, to which correspond various 
business models: TV sets (Free-to-Air, Pay-TV, Pay-per-View, Video-on-
Demand), mobile phones and personal computers (IPTV, Internet TV, P2P).  
Regulation of these two broad categories of distribution systems – 
physical and virtual – is asymmetric. To some extent, this asymmetry seems 
to reflect historical accident more than a specific public policy objective. This 
is the case, for instance, of the provisions existing in many countries 
requiring theatrical distributors to provide detailed data on the success of 
individual titles to national film agencies or equivalent public policy bodies. 
These provisions do not apply to other distribution systems, such as video 
rental or providers of PPV or VoD services. Other differences in regulation 
reflect differences in salient public policy objectives. Indeed, virtual networks 
possess characteristics calling for more careful public policy scrutiny than 
physical networks. 
In the world of traditional media, the most pressing issue concerning 
virtual distribution networks was one of scarcity. Access of content owners to 
the delivery layer was constrained by the limited availability of distribution 
networks due to the high degree of concentration and high barriers to entry 
(partly endogenous, as explained below) of the traditional media industry. In 
such a context, the distribution layer enjoyed greater bargaining power with 
respect to the production layer in so far as the latter confronted, in many 
countries, a situation akin to monopsony or oligopsony. These 
characteristics of the market constitute the rationale for provisions such as 
for instance the imposition of "must carry" obligations on network operators. 
In the world of technological convergence and new media platforms, the 
distribution of bargaining power has shifted to some extent towards content 
right-holders so that, while the question of efficient incentives to invest in 
content production has become relatively less pressing, the crucial public 
policy issue has become the need to ensure efficient incentives to invest in 
the development of competing delivery networks, according to principles of 
network neutrality (See MENDES PEREIRA, 2002). The two issues – that of 
the incentives to produce content and that of the incentives to invest in 
3 For a technical survey see PARSONS & FRIEDEN (1998). 84     No. 71, 3
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network development – are strictly intertwined because of the network 
effects that characterize virtual content distribution systems. 
Network effects imply that the marginal value of each system to any 
consumer increases with the number of subscriptions. They therefore have 
roll out dynamics according to which a sufficient amount of subscriptions is 
needed to make development of the network profitable. Content pricing 
deeply impacts on network roll-out because the utility a consumer draws 
from access to a given network critically depends on the type and quantity of 
premium contents he has access to through the network. In order to 
compete effectively, access to a sufficiently rich bundle of rights to content is 
needed. This gives rise to a sort of chicken-and-egg problem residing in the 
fact that, in order to gain market share and invest in network development 
access to a sufficiently wide bundle of rights to premium content is needed 
but, to gain access to such content, it is necessary to have large enough 
networks and market shares. The Commission seems aware of this 
interdependence between network and content regulation, as it appears 
from reading the Framework Directive 4.
The implications of convergence have still to be ascertained to their full 
extent, but a few elements – all concurring to enhance the role of premium 
contents as critical bottlenecks – can be pointed out. The first is that the 
increase in network capacity due to digitalization determines an increase in 
the demand for content that opens up the possibility of new (often niche) 
markets. The second is that with technological advancement, the 
transmission quality of different networks tends to become more and more 
homogeneous. Moreover, technological barriers to the merging of networks 
tend to be erased, giving rise to a convergent basis for data transmission. 
Both of these developments imply that consumers' preferences tend to be 
driven by content rather than technology much more than before.  
4 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 
108/33, 24.4.2002. Recital 5 starts by saying: "The convergence of the telecommunications, 
media and information technology sectors means all transmission networks and services should 
be covered by a single regulatory framework". Moreover it asserts that even if  "it is necessary 
to separate the regulation of transmission from the regulation of content", however "the 
separation between the regulation of transmission and the regulation of content does not 
prejudice the taking into account of the links existing between them, in particular in order to 
guarantee media pluralism, cultural diversity and consumer protection". A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  85 
In this changing scenario ex post public policy intervention in the form of 
antitrust scrutiny has played and continues to play a pivotal role. Incumbent 
market players in the delivery layer have in many cases adopted strategies – 
such as vertical integration, exclusivity and restrictive distribution clauses – 
exacerbating the chicken-and-egg problem described above. Exclusive 
contracts undermine new entrants' incentives to make the large sunk and/or 
specific investments needed to gain access to a given delivery platform 
and/or to build their own infrastructure: if you do not have contents, why 
invest in a delivery platform? At the same time, without any access to 
competitive delivery platforms, there aren't sufficient incentives to invest in 
content exclusivity.  
To sum up, the preceding analysis has identified the following objectives 
of both ex ante and ex post regulation. First, the combination of ex ante laws 
and regulations and antitrust intervention should be aimed at preserving 
content producers' incentives to invest. Strictly linked to the issue of 
providing incentives to the production of contents is the issue of providing 
incentives to invest in the delivery of contents. Content distribution involves 
various sorts of investments, often made by different parties. In particular, 
three forms of investment are particularly relevant: investment in the 
packaging of content, investment in marketing and promotion of content, 
investment in branding content and signaling quality to consumers. All of 
these forms of investments are important from a public policy perspective in 
light of the fact that the choices relating to the packaging of content are a 
crucial dimension of the satisfaction of consumers' preferences and in light 
of the informational asymmetries present in the market for audio-visual 
content and of the 'experience good' nature of content. Second, public policy 
should take into account the need for providing sufficient incentives to invest 
in the development of distribution networks. What the preceding discussion 
underlines is that attention should be devoted to both incumbent operators' 
incentives and new entrants' incentives. Finally, given incumbents' 
incentives to adopt market foreclosure strategies, a third public policy 
objective worth consideration is the restraint of incumbents' dominant 
position.  86     No. 71, 3
rd Q. 2008 
  A capsule overview of recent competition policy 
developments favouring access to content 
Although the four public policy objectives identified in the previous 
paragraph might appear rather uncontroversial, the recent history of antitrust 
intervention in Europe shows, on one side, that ackowledgement of all four 
objectives has required some time and, on the other side, that the policy 
measures adopted in their pursuit have often had unintended consequences.  
NCAs have for a long time paid scant attention to the need to ensure a 
level playing field for competing platforms so as to provide incentives to the 
development of alternative delivery networks. The characteristics of the 
media sector were interpreted to imply the existence of a "natural oligopoly", 
an ineliminable high degree of concentration, so that the competition model 
adopted was one of competition for the market. The choice of this model has 
been apparent in the antitrust treatment of both vertical integration and 
exclusive distribution contracts.  
Content exclusivity has long been interpreted as the only way to 
guarantee, on one side, the remuneration of investments in content 
production (thus preserving ex-ante incentives to invest in content 
production) and, on the other side, the remuneration of investments in the 
building of infrastructures (thus preserving the associated investment 
incentives). The rationale for content exclusivity was mainly supported by the 
high costs of producing and, consequently, accessing contents.  
It is worth noting that producers' and distributors' interests might diverge 
with respect to exclusivity. While producers/owners aim of maximizing 
revenues net of distribution costs might entail the maximization of the 
diffusion of contents across all platforms, distributors' profit maximization 
entails the interest to acquire contents exclusively and raise entry barriers. 
The choice of exclusivity thus depends on the level of penetration of different 
technological platforms in different countries. In countries where a single 
platform has a satisfactory geographic coverage, it is more likely to observe 
exclusive contracts. In countries where, by contrast, no platform enjoys 
universal coverage, exclusive contracts will generally not be observed, if A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  87 
anything because to reach the entire geographic market agreements with 
multiple operators have to be reached 5.
Exclusivity agreements have been accorded the presumption of being a 
pro-competitive device in both European and international law. This 
approach, restated at the European level by the law for exemption by 
category (no. 2790/99)  6, identifies several precise circumstances (among 
which the market shares of the interested parties and the barriers to entry in 
the respective markets) requiring a case by case antitrust analysis of their 
possible anti-competitive effects. 
A regulatory framework of this sort – that allows premium contents to be 
acquired on an exclusive basis – promotes competition for the market to the 
detriment of competition in the market because it creates a competitive 
environment whereby the first comer has a privileged access to subscribers, 
while new comers have to compete for gaining access to the residual supply 
of contents. Since subscribers are attracted by premium, in turn, they 
address their demand to the 'best' contents selected by the incumbent. As a 
consequence, being the first comer gives to the content buyer an 
extraordinary competitive advantage over competitors. Again, this means 
that competitors may succeed in the market (especially on the Pay-TV 
market) only if they are able to compete for content exclusivity in the first 
instance, rather than compete in the market by having access only to the 
residual contents disregarded by the incumbent. The rationale underlying 
this approach implies that, in order to improve competition for the market it 
might be sufficient to reduce exclusivity duration and to allow for frequent 
bids.
The favourable treatment of exclusivity clauses has had some 
unintended consequences that have recently had the effect of suggesting a 
revision of NCAs' original position  7 in favour of content exclusivity. The 
competition model based on competition for the market has soon led, on one 
side, to monopolistic markets and, on the other side, to an extraordinary 
growth of programming costs. Since the only way to compete was to bid for 
5 This is the case, for instance, of the French market for VoD services where no single operator 
covers the entire geographic market. 
6 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/99 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices7, OJ [1999], L336/21.  
7 A summary of this attitude could be traced in WACHTMEISTER (1998). 88     No. 71, 3
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content exclusivity, incumbent operators raised their offers as a raising rivals' 
costs strategy (Salop and Schefman, 1993) in order to preserve their market 
power and their client base. In other words, by raising their bids for premium 
content, incumbents have been able to make information goods scarce and 
increase their access costs, thus implementing a pre-emption strategy to 
increase costs for existing and potential competitors. In other words, while 
the high costs of access to contents had been interpreted as a reasonable 
justification for a lenient antitrust treatment of exclusivity, the very diffusion of 
exclusive contracts has led to the explosion of such costs, raising barriers to 
entry.
In recent years, the European Commission as well as National 
Competition Authorities (NCAs) in Europe and elsewhere have started to 
ackowledge the drawbacks of the adoption of a model of competition for the 
market, experiencing a remarkable change in the antitrust treatment of 
exclusivity clauses and vertical integration (NICITA & RAMELLO, 2005). 
Indeed, the main drawback of a competition for the market approach lies in 
the fact that it is mainly based on the analysis of the incentives held by the 
first comer, and it completely neglects the incentives of potential 
competitors. NCAs have thus only recently started to broaden their 
perception of the issue of incentives to invest in the development of content 
delivery networks so as to take into account the incentives to invest in the 
development of new media platforms, in a perspective of network neutrality 
and have taken steps to restrain incumbents' dominant position, especially in 
cases of vertical integration.  
Important European antitrust decisions (MENDES PEREIRA, 2003a, 
2003b; HARRISON & WOODS, 2007) that reflect this trend include 
BskyB / OFT 8,  Vodafone / Vivendi / Canal  Plus 9,  Vivendi / Canal 
Plus / Seagram 10,  Sogecable / CanalSatélite / Via  Digital 11,
NewsCorp / Canal  Plus 12, UEFA Champion's League  13. Rather than 
8 OFT (1996), "The Director General’s Review of BSkyB’s Position in the Wholesale Pay TV 
Market," December 1996. A second review has been started in 2002.  
9 Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal Commission Decision, COMP/JV 48, 20
th July 2002. 
10 Case COMP/M. 2050 Vivendi/Canal Plus/Seagram, decision of 13.10.2000, OJ C 311/3, 
31.10.2000.
11 COMP/M.2845 Sogecable/Canalsatélite/ViaDigital, case decided by the Spanish 
Competition authorities following a referral by the European Commission. 
12 Case COMP/M. 2876 Newscorp/Telepiù, OJ C 255/20, 23.10.2002. 
13 Case COMP/C2/37.398 UEFA Champions League, Notice published pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 196/3, 17.8.2002. See also Press Release IP/02/806 of 3.6.2002. A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  89 
focusing on each of these cases separately, we will discuss the implications 
of the new rationale behind them and behind some relevant non-European 
cases by identifying a number of stylized regulatory models (actual or 
potential) that may result from the combination of the set of remedies that 
have been adopted in each of them. 
  Concurring stylized models for access to contents 
In this section we outline the main features surrounding a number of 
stylized models for access to contents resulting from the combination of 
some form of antitrust or regulatory intervention and business strategies, 
with respect to the four dimensions that we have outlined in the previous 
paragraphs and that we deem key to evaluate their effects: (a) right-holders' 
incentives to invest in producing/distributing contents; (b) incumbents' 
incentives to invest in dominant platforms; (c) new entrants' incentives to 
invest in alternative platforms; and (d) ability to discipline incumbents' 
dominant position.  
Prohibition of exclusive selling/purchasing 
The first model that it is worth describing is one based on the total 
absence of exclusive selling or purchasing of valuable contents. This model 
constitutes an ideal-type benchmark, very difficult to envisage in real 
markets, although perhaps US markets display some of its elements in 
consequence of both market forces and aspects of the regulatory 
framework. In US markets, the existence of many competing platforms 
creates strong incentives for right-holders to sell their contents to all 
competing platforms, without discriminating among them. Moreover, ex ante
regulations aimed at limiting the negative effects of exclusivity have been 
implemented on at least two occasions. In 1992, the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act 14 has introduced a Programme 
Access and Carriage Rule that explicitly prohibits to platforms vertically 
integrated to a channel to distribute the channel under an exclusive contract 
and disallows discriminatory practices in the sale of television channels by 
14 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act , Public Law 102-385-- CT. 5, 
1992, 106 STAT. 1460. 90     No. 71, 3
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editors vertically integrated with a platform. In 1999, the Satellite Home 
Viewer Improvement Act 15 introduced for Free-to-Air operators a must offer 
obligation and a prohibition to stipulate exclusive agreements for the 
retransmission with a single platform. 
The advantages of this benchmark model concern two of the regulatory 
dimensions highlighted above. In particular, this model provides new 
entrants with best incentives to invest in alternative platforms and thus 
complies with the principles of "network neutrality" because it allows 
effective competition for subscribers by different platforms. In addition to this, 
if platforms are symmetrically developed, a model characterized by the 
absence of any exclusivity may induce competition to turn on the ability to 
satisfy consumers' preferences in terms of packages of content and may 
thus stimulate investments in the packaging of bundles that achieve this aim. 
It also has the effect, of course, of disciplining the dominant position of 
vertically integrated operators. However, this model may dampen incumbent 
network operators' incentives because of the lack of any exclusivity. 
Moreover, the impact of this regime on right-holders' incentives to invest in 
the production of valuable content is difficult to assess since it clearly 
depends on the effective development of alternative platforms. While ex-
post, in a world of mature and developed competing platforms, right-holders 
could benefit from the removal of any exclusivity, they could suffer some 
short-term losses in a world characterized by under-developed platforms. 
Multi-Platform Exclusivity with mandatory wholesale offer 
This model was first introduced in the UK, when the dominant firm BskyB
was forced by OFT's moral suasion to promote a wholesale offer based on 
retail minus pricing to competitors in alternative platforms 16. In this case, the 
dominant firm which purchased on an exclusive basis the premium contents 
assumed the role of a market gate-keeper (namely, of a firm able to exercize 
a significant influence on the premium contents market) delivering contents 
to its own platform and to competing platforms on a non discriminatory basis. 
Under this model, a single firm possesses exclusive rights on premium 
contents for all platforms but cannot broadcast them exclusively, being 
forced to distribute such contents non-discriminatorily. Competitors may 
15 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, 106
th Congress, 1
st Session, S. 1948. 
16 OFT (1996), "The Director General’s Review of BSkyB’s Position in the Wholesale Pay TV 
Market", December 1996. A second review has been started in 2002. A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  91 
therefore increase their market share with respect to the incumbent 
according to their compared efficiency in economizing on avoidable 
distribution costs, rather than on the nature and availability of the premium 
contents delivered to final customers.  
This model has thus positive effects in terms of investments in innovative 
and more efficient platforms. This is because the innovative features of the 
delivery system constitute the main competitive tools. Moreover, these tools 
are used by new entrants to discipline incumbents' market power. Thus, to 
some extent, this model also has some positive effects in terms of the ability 
to discipline incumbents' dominant position, even if through indirect means. 
The effects on incumbents' incentives to invest in dominant platforms are 
more difficult to assess and depend on the effective development of 
competitive dynamics. The effects on right-holders' incentives are, by 
contrast, clearer and more positive. 
A partially different model of this sort has been designed by the European 
Competition Commission in the NewsCorp/Telepiù 17 merger. In that case, 
the dominant firm assumed the obligation to provide an unbundled 
wholesale offer to competitors operating on alternative platforms for 
premium contents. The wholesale offer was intended to allow competitors of 
the new entity on platforms other than DTH to subsist or to enter in the 
Italian pay-TV market. The underlying idea was that by allowing non-DTH 
pay-TV operators to gain access through the wholesale offer to premium 
contents that would otherwise be too costly to purchase directly or that were 
locked away by means of long-duration exclusivity agreements, short-term 
entry would be encouraged in the Italian pay-TV market. As a consequence, 
the competitors had the possibility to choose and unbundle specific contents 
from the incumbent's offer and to promote its own package to final 
customers.  
This version of the model has the effect of increasing competitors' 
incentives not only to invest in the efficiency of the alternative platform as a 
strategic tool to differentiate their services from the incumbent's but also of 
inducing competitors to innovate on the packaging of contents delivered to 
customers, disciplining market power in a more effective way.  
17 Case COMP/M. 2876 Newscorp/Telepiù, OJ C 255/20, 23.10.2002. 92     No. 71, 3
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Platform Exclusivity with Prohibition of hold-back clauses 
This model can be considered the outcome of a series of remedies 
imposed on dominant firms in several competition cases in Europe 
(HARRISON & WOODS, 2007). The remedy – the prohibition of hold-up 
clauses – consists of preventing dominant firms from extending exclusivity 
clauses on platforms other than those they currently serve. The main 
purpose of this remedy is that of preventing market pre-emption by 
incumbent firms at the expenses of new operators investing in alternative 
platform. At the same time, this model implicitly designs a market system 
characterized by platform exclusivity, thus suggesting a progressive 
segmentation of the wide pay-TV market into a monopolistic competition 
market with a local monopoly for each platform.   
This model thus increases incentives to invest in both dominant and 
alternative platforms but only does so for those operators who win the 
competition for gaining exclusive access to premium contents. For these 
operators, this model also offers incentives to invest in the packaging of 
contents to the extent that multiple platforms develop. At the same time, the 
incentives for right-holders, as in case (a) above, are ambiguous since they 
really depend on the degree of development of alternative platforms. Also, it 
is questionable whether this model is sufficiently strong to discipline 
incumbents' dominant position as long as there is a substantial asymmetry 
between the dominant and competitors' platforms penetration in the market. 
This is the reason why, generally, this remedy has been coupled with a 
mandatory duty on dominant firms to provide competitors with a wholesale 
offer, as in the NewsCorp/Telepiù case.  
'Time Windows' exclusivity 
Time windows exclusivity represents the traditional way in which 
premium contents have been commercialized since the birth of the media 
industry. Releasing content within well-defined subsequent 'time windows' 
constitutes a form of price discrimination based on customers' impatience, 
i.e. on customers' preferences about the time of consumption of a given 
content. When the time interval between theatrical exhibition and release on 
alternative delivery platforms discriminates among different groups of 
customers it determines different markets or market segments. These have 
generally been theatrical release in cinemas, Video-DVD rental, pay-TV and 
free-to-air TV. More recently, technological innovation has further enhanced A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  93 
right-holders' ability to promote temporal price discrimination. Pay-per-view
(PPV) and near-video-on-demand (NVOD) represent recently developed 
modalities of consumption that allow customers to have access to a given 
content (particularly movies) before appearance on pay-TV. Thus a 'pay per 
view' or a 'NVOD' window has been added to the portfolio of right-holders 
who can actually sell, for instance, the same content as a "Pay per view 
right" to an operator and as a "pay-TV right" to another one. Fiber optic cable 
and advanced x-DSL allows video on demand consumption and some right-
holders have also started offering this kind of rights. Even if these rights are 
linked somewhat to a specific technology (as in the case of VOD, which 
could not be delivered by a satellite operator given the need for two-way 
transmission of data) they could generally be bought by alternative 
platforms. 
Since 'time windows' rights are a sort of umbrella rights (because they 
cover, for instance, pay per view consumption under any platform) they act, 
in fact, as a form of multi-platform exclusivity, providing the purchaser with 
powerful incentives to invest, while inhibiting non-owners' access and 
investments. Right-holders could benefit from this form of rights definition as 
long as they are able to extract all the potential rents from buyers. An 
important issue to be addressed in this regard, however, concerns the 
opportunity to modify the sequence of time windows, especially as regards 
the priority accorded to home video with respect to VOD. New media 
platform operators complain, in fact, that the fact that content is available on 
the home video time window before it is available as VOD significantly 
reduces the number of subscribers to their platforms and thus decreases 
their incentives to invest. 
Content sharing and purchasing pools 
Content sharing in the form of joint buying pools is the most recent model 
of gaining access to content. The primary example of this model is 
observable in the Australian pay-TV market and has been adopted as a way 
to control the huge price increase for premium contents. Aspects of this 
model have also come into play in a couple of European cases. One case in 
point is the notification to the European Commission by Sogecable and 
Telefonica 18 of a joint purchasing agreement relating to the broacasting 
18 COMP/M.2845 Sogecable/Canalsatélite/ViaDigital, case decided by the Spanish 
Competition authorities following a referral by the European Commission. 94     No. 71, 3
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rights to Spanish First League Football matches. The case was closed 
following the Via Digital/Sogecable merger, although in the meantime the 
Commission had imposed the termination or the substantial modification of 
the agreement. Another case in point is the decision of the Commission 
concerning the European Broadcasting Union. In that case, the joint 
purchasing arrangement was allowed under strict sub-licensing rules. The 
decision was, however, later annulled by the Court of First Instance. 
In the Australian case, the joint purchasing agreement concerned the 
major pay-TV operators in the market, namely Foxtel, Optus, Telstra and 
Austar. In particular, the agreement took the form of a content supply 
agreement whereby Foxtel acted as a content reseller, buying rights under 
exclusive contracts and then reselling to competitors. The horizontal 
agreement was authorized by the Australian Competition and Consumers 
Commission subject to a number of undertakings 19.
The Australian experience suggests that this model may give rise to 
relevant antitrust concerns and result in the formation of anti-competitive 
cartels when it involves dominant operators or oligopolistic markets. More 
specifically, joint purchasing agreements of this form may have negative 
effects on the incentives of the operators taking part in the agreement 
different from the content reseller (especially if the agreement is coupled 
with provisions restraining their freedom to package channels and content) 
but also on the incentives of potential entrants into the market. In addition to 
this, it is highly likely for this model to have only limited effects in terms of 
discipline of incumbents' dominant position. It may even have perverse 
effects, depending on the specification of the agreement. Conversely, when 
limited to new entrants this model could encourage entry, abating the costs 
of rights acquisition. The Australian example thus shows that this sort of 
purchasing agreement could work only to the extent that it is not enacted in 
order to reduce downstream incentives to compete on prices and it is 
extended to new entrants. Moreover, in order to avoid its drawbacks, it is 
important for it to be coupled with a wholesale offer or with specific 
sublicensing provisions. 
19 Relevant documents are downloadable at: 
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Selling partitioning 
This model has been recently adopted by competition and regulatory 
authorities in order to enhance competition in accessing premium sport 
contents when right-holders are grouped in a unique selling unit. The 
reference case in this regard is the European Commission's UEFA decision, 
concerning the joint selling of commercial rights to the events of the UEFA 
Champions League 20. On that occasion, the Commission deemed the joint 
selling arrangement liable to restrict competition at the upstream level and 
exempted it only under a number of relevant modifications. In particular, the 
re-notified agreement included provisions attributing the football clubs the 
rights to sell specific media rights to the matches in which they participate in 
parallel to the UEFA, to provide video content on the internet with a delay of 
one and a half hours from the match, and to provide audio/video content on 
UMTS platforms with a technical delay of 5 minutes.  
A more extreme form of selling partitioning has been the prevalent model 
in the Italian market for premium soccer starting from 1999. In that year, 
following an intervention of the Italian Antitrust Authority  21 and a 
Government legislative initiative, TV rights were attributed to the single 
football clubs that were left ample room to fix prices to their own content. 
The freedom of maneuver of large football clubs, holders of the rights to the 
most valuable content, gave rise to an extraordinary increase in prices, 
which rose from 112 million euros in the season 1998/1999 to 408 million 
euros in the season 1999/2000. More recently, a legislative proposal has 
been approved that will reintroduce  22 centralized selling of rights by the 
Lega Calcio but with the joint attribution of rights to football clubs.  
The two mentioned circumstances suggest that the evaluation of this 
model along the four dimensions we consider necessarily gives rise to very 
mixed results. On one side, centralized selling might allow the realization of 
important efficiencies through the reduction of transaction costs. This, in 
turn, may have a positive impact on both incumbents' and new entrants' 
incentives. On the other side, however, it seems safe to conclude that 
centralization is not to be considered, per se, a greater source of barriers to 
entry than partitioning of the rights. Indeed, the price inflation generated by 
20 Case COMP/C2/37.398 UEFA Champions League, Notice published pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 196/3, 17.8.2002. 
21 AGCM, Provvedimento n. 10985,( I362B), Vendita Diritti Televisivi. 
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the separate selling of rights by Italian football clubs from 1999 on had the 
effect of raising barriers to entry and thus of reducing incentives to the 
investment in alternative platforms. In other words, it seems that the relevant 
issue is not so much whether sale is centralized or decentralized but rather 
what kind of arrangements are devised for the unbundling (in terms of time 
and scope) of the different media rights relating to each match. Incentives to 
the production of valuable content are also difficult to assess, in light of the 
above, although it is perhaps worth noting that this issue might be slightly 
less relevant in the case of sports events than in the case of other premium 
content. A clear conclusion can be drawn, by contrast, with regard to the 
extremely limited effects of this model in terms of potential to discipline 
incumbents' dominant position.  
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  Fragmentation of property rights: a new regulatory 
issue?
The previous paragraphs have hinted at the fact that the recent history of 
the antitrust treatment of content issues has mainly been concerned with 
issues of excessive aggregation of rights to valuable digital content following 
from the fact that an amount of rights that is deemed excessive according to 
some relevant metrics is held or may be acquired exclusively by a single 
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The remedies adopted to address the excessive degree of aggregation of 
rights to content have gone in the direction of limiting exclusivity along three 
dimensions: (a) duration; (b) scope and (c) degree of unbundling of the 
rights. These remedies have been imposed in the context of very different 
legal actions and through widely diverging means (moral suasion, imposition 
of undertakings etc.). The combination of these scattered interventions, 
occurring at different times and in different geographic markets has resulted 
in anything but a coherent picture. The outcome of the process is a 
landscape in which the nature of the rights enjoyed by different players in the 
market might be very heterogeneous. Exclusive rights might be defined 
geographically, by platform, refer only to a specific transmission mode (VOD, 
NVOD etc.) and refer only to a subset of the supply of a given content 
provider.  
This suggests the possibility of the emergence of what, in the L&E 
literature is called an "anticommons", i.e. a property regime characterized by 
a degree of definition of property rights excessive or incoherent at the point 
of inducing a sub-optimal exploitation of the resource. More precisely, an 
"anticommons" may arise in circumstances in which the rights to exclude 
from access to a given resource are defined in a way that is incoherent with 
the design that would maximize the productive use of the resource: there is 
lack of conformity between the right to use and the right to exclude from 
access. When this is the case, the transaction costs required to maximize 
the use value of the resource are so high that bargaining to access the 
resource may be discouraged, leading to underutilization of the resource.  
Incoherent fragmentation of rights to valuable content raises problems 
both from a supply side perspective and from a demand side perspective. 
The problem from the supply side resides in the fact that effective entry by 
competing platform operators in any platform depends on the operators' 
ability to secure access to a significant bundle of premium contents. The 
fragmentation and heterogeneity of the rights granted by content providers to 
different market players may constitute an additional hurdle to this end 
because of the transaction costs that need to be incurred to aggregate the 
rights corresponding to the minimum bundle necessary for accessing the 
market. Moreover, rights fragmentation might also be an obstacle to an 
efficient integration of transmission modes, in cases in which a single 
operator may want to exploit sinergies from the joint offer of different 
services to consumers.  
From the demand side, it is clear that fragmentation has significant 
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rd Q. 2008 
premium contents available for consumption increase and as their price 
decreases. Fragmentation has negative consequences with regard to both 
availability and prices. Even setting aside the exacerbation of the chicken-
and-egg problem leading to increased entry barriers just described, the 
emergence of an "anticommons" has the effect of limiting the availability of 
contents available through any single technological platform. This is relevant 
from the consumer's point of view in that it implies the need to access 
multiple platforms in order to consume the desired bundle of premium 
contents. Moreover, a clear consequence of the existence of an 
"anticommons" highlighted by the law&economics literature is the increase in 
the costs of acquiring the complementary rights. This is due both to the 
transaction costs associated to the multiplication of the required bargains 
and to the problem of complementary monopolies mentioned above. The 
increase in acquisition prices, in turn, in a market characterized by a 
relatively low elasticity of demand, tends to translate into price increases.  
It might thus be opportune for regulators to devote their attention not only 
to granitic exclusivities accorded to single operators but also to the 
consequences of the observed tendency towards sub-optimal fragmentation 
of the rights to valuable content.   
  Conclusions: towards an integrated European approach 
to Access to premium contents? 
The emergence of a multiplicity of approaches to access to premium 
contents and the possible drawbacks of increasing property rights 
fragmentation sketched out in this paper might be taken to suggest the 
opportunity to develop a coherent and coordinated European regulatory 
approach to the problem. Of course, this does not mean that responsibility 
for the elaboration of such an approach should necessarily be attributed to a 
specific institution of the European Union, as greater coordination among 
national regulatory authorities may suffice to this end. 
Ideally, such a coordinated approach should be characterized by three 
basic features. First, it should be homogeneous, i.e. it should treat different 
sorts of rights to premium content in an analogous way. Second, it should be 
non-discriminatory as regards different operators. In particular, it should take 
seriously into account both incumbents' and new entrants' incentives to 
invest. Finally, it should be conceived as a set of transitory measures, meant A. NICITA & M.A. ROSSI  99 
to be in force within a pre-defined time frame or, alternatively, only as long 
as a pre-defined level of new/old platform penetration is achieved. 
Moving in this direction would surely have the advantage of reducing 
inconsistencies in a market that is global to a significant extent at the 
upstream level (i.e. at the level of production of premium contents such as 
blockbuster movies) and has been so far disciplined through scattered 
antitrust interventions. While we are aware of the difficulties of devising 
sector-specific regulatory models in contexts characterized by rapid 
technological evolution and change of business models, it seems 
nonetheless important to stimulate debate on the opportunity to confront a 
broad set of issues related to the question of access to content in an 
informed and technically competent arena.  100     No. 71, 3
rd Q. 2008 
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